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WeadoptthenotionofvonNeumann–Morgenstern(vNM)farsightedlystablesets
to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted in
one-to-onematching problems. Weprovidethe characterization ofvNMfarsight-
edly stable sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if
it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM (myopically) stable
sets (Ehlers 2007), vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are
not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one
matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM
farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the
strong core.
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1. Introduction
Gale and Shapley (1962) propose the simple two-sided matching model, known as the
marriage problem, in which matchings are one-to-one. There are two disjoint sets of
agents—men and women—and the problem is to match agents from one side of the
market with agents from the other side, where each agent has the possibility to remain
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single. They show that the core is nonempty. A matching is in the core if there is no sub-
set of agents who, by forming all their partnerships only among themselves (and having
the possibility of becoming single), can all obtain a strictly preferred set of partners.1
Recently, Ehlers (2007) characterizes the von Neumann–Morgenstern (hereafter, vNM)
stable sets in one-to-one matching problems. A set of matchings is a vNM stable set if
this set satisﬁes two conditions: (internal stability) no matching inside the set is domi-
nated by a matching belonging to the set; (external stability) any matching outside the
set is dominated by some matching belonging to the set. Ehlers (2007) shows that the
set of matchings in the core is a subset of any vNM stable set.
The notions of core and of vNM stable set are myopic notions since the agents
cannot be farsighted in the sense that individual and coalitional deviations cannot be
countered by subsequent deviations.2 An interesting contribution is Diamantoudi and
Xue (2003), who investigate farsighted stability in hedonic games (of which one-to-
one matching problems are a special case) by introducing the notion of the coalitional
largest farsighted conservative stable set, which coincides with the largest consistent
set of Chwe (1994).3 The largest consistent set is based on the indirect dominance re-
lation, which captures the fact that farsighted agents consider the end matching that
their move(s) may lead to. Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) show that in hedonic games
with strict preferences, core partitions arealways contained in thelargest consistent set.
However, we show by means of an example that the largest consistent set may contain
more matchings than those matchings that are in the core. Based on the indirect dom-
inance relation, Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) deﬁne the farsighted (or abstract) core as
the set of matchings that are not indirectly dominated. But the farsighted core is too ex-
clusive because it does not take into account the credibility of the dominating matching
and, hence, it can often be empty. The farsighted core exists only when the core con-
tains a unique matching and no other matching indirectly dominates the matching in
the core.
In this paper, we adoptthe notion of von Neumann–Morgenstern farsightedly stable
sets to determine which matchings are possibly stable when agents are farsighted. This
concept is studied by Chwe (1994), who introduces the notion of indirect dominance
into the standard deﬁnition of vNM stable sets. Thus, a set of matchings is a vNM far-
sightedly stable set if no matching inside the set is indirectly dominated by a matching
belonging to the set (internal stability) and any matching outside the set is indirectly
dominated by some matching belonging to the set (external stability).
Our main result is the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets in one-to-one
matching problems. We show that a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if
and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the core. Thus, contrary to the vNM
(myopically) stable sets, vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are
not in the core. In other words, we provide an alternative characterization of the core in
1We refer to RothandSotomayor(1990)foracomprehensiveoverviewontwo-sidedmatchingproblems.
2Harsanyi (1974) argues that the von Neumann–Morgenstern deﬁnition of stable sets is unsatisfactory
because it neglects the destabilizing effect of indirect dominance relations.
3Other approaches to farsightedness in coalition and/or network formation are suggested by the work of
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one-to-one matching problems. We also show that our main result is robust to many-
to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM
farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong
core. Finally, we show that if the preferences satisfy the top coalition property, then the
unique vNM farsightedly stable set, the farsighted core, and the largest consistent set
consist of the unique core element.
It is straightforward to see that if a matching belongs to the core, then it indirectly
dominates all other matchings and hence it must be a vNM farsightedly stable set. This
by itself does not characterize the vNM stable sets in a matching problem. Indeed, we
need to tackle the question of whether there can be matchings that do not belong to
the core, but do belong to some vNM farsightedly stable set. This question is not trivial,
as in general the core matchings can be indirectly dominated by matchings that do not
belong to the core.
Our characterization raises the question of why the idea of vNM farsightedly sta-
ble sets makes sense in the case where the core contains more than one element, as
any vNM farsightedly stable set is indirectly dominated by any other vNM farsightedly
stable set. We should keep in mind that the idea of a vNM (farsightedly) stable set is
a set-valued concept and, as such, is fundamentally different from a non-cooperative
equilibrium concept: any deviation from a vNM farsightedly stable set, even to another
stableset,isdeterredbecausethereisa(farsighted)pathleadingbacktotheinitialstable
set. As Diamantoudi and Xue (2007) write, a vNM (farsightedly) stable set of matchings
is “free from inner contradictions and accounts for every element it excludes.” In fact,
vNM farsightedly stable sets can be interpreted as the set of social outcomes consis-
tent with a certain stable standard of behavior (Greenberg 1990). In particular, agents
do not deviate if there exists a path leading back to the solution set in which the devia-
tors are not better off and, as such, they behave optimistically in the face of (Knightian)
uncertainty (Xue 1998). We show that any matching that belongs to the core, and no
other set of matchings, satisﬁes the requirements of an optimistic stable standard of
behavior: for any deviation there is a path leading back to this core matching. If the
core contains more than one element, each one of them is then a stable standard of
behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces one-to-one matching prob-
lems and standard notions of stability. Section 3 deﬁnes vNM farsightedly stable sets.
Section 4 provides the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable sets in one-to-one
matching problems. Section 5 deals with many-to-one matching problems. Section 6
concludes.
2. One-to-one matching problems
A one-to-one matching problem consists of a set of N agents divided into a set of men,
M ={ m1     mr}, and a set of women, W ={ w1     ws}, where possibly r  = s.W es o m e -
times denote a generic agent by i,ag e n e r i cm a nb ym, and a generic woman by w.E a c h
agent has a complete and transitive preference ordering over the agents on the other
side of the market and the prospect of being alone. Preferences are assumed to be strict.
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over W ∪{ m} and for each woman w ∈ W a strict preference ordering over M ∪{ w}:
P ={ P(m1)     P(mr) P(w1)     P(ws)},w h e r eP(i)is agent i’s strict preference order-
ing over the agents on the other side of the market and himself (or herself). For in-
stance, P(w)= m4 m1 w m2 m3     mr indicates that woman w prefers m4 to m1 and
she prefers to remain single rather than to marry anyone else. We denote by R the weak
orders associated with P.W ew r i t em  w m  if woman w strictly prefers m to m ,w r i t e
m ∼w m  if w is indifferent between m and m , and write m  w m  if m  w m  or m ∼w m .
Similarly, we write w  m w , w ∼m w ,a n dw  m w . A one-to-one matching problem is
simply a triple (M W P).
A matching is a function μ:N → N satisfying the following properties: (i) ∀m ∈ M,
μ(m) ∈ W ∪{ m}; (ii) ∀w ∈ W , μ(w) ∈ M ∪{ w}; and (iii) ∀i ∈ N, μ(μ(i)) = i. We denote
by M the set of all matchings. Given a matching μ,a na g e n ti is said to be unmatched
or single if μ(i) = i. A matching μ is individually rational if each agent is acceptable to
his or her mate, i.e., μ(i)  i i for all i ∈ N. For a given matching μ,ap a i r{m w} (possibly
m = w)i ss a i dt of o r mablocking pair if they are not matched to one another but prefer
one another to their mates at μ, i.e., w  m μ(m) and m  w μ(w). A matching μ is stable
(or pairwise stable) if it is not blocked by any individual or any pair of agents.
We extend each agent’s preference over the agent’s potential partners to the set of
matchings in the following way. We say that agent i prefers μ  to μ if and only if agent i
prefers his or her mate at μ  to his or her mate at μ, μ (i)  i μ(i). Abusing notation,
we write this as μ   i μ. A coalition S is a subset of the set of agents N.4 For S ⊆ N,
μ(S) ={ μ(i):i ∈ S} denotes the set of mates of agents in S at μ. A matching μ is blocked
by a coalition S ⊆ N if there exists a matching μ  such that μ (S) = S and for all i ∈ S,
μ   i μ.I fS blocks μ,t h e nS is called a blocking coalition for μ. Note that if a coalition
S ⊆ N blocksamatchingμ,thenthereexistsapair{m w}(possiblym = w)thatblocksμ.
The core of a matching problem consists of all matchings that are not blocked by any
coalition. An alternative way to deﬁne the core of a matching problem is by means of
the domination relation.
Definition 1. Given a matching μ, a coalition S ⊆ N is said to be able to enforce
a matching μ  over μ if the following conditions hold: (i) μ (i) / ∈{ μ(i) i} implies
{i μ (i)}⊆S and (ii) μ (i) = i  = μ(i) implies {i μ(i)}∩S  = ∅.
In other words, this enforceability condition implies both that any new match in μ 
that does not exist in μ should be between players in S, and that to destroy an existing
match in μ, one of the two players involved in that match should belong to coalition S.5
Notice that the concept of enforceability is independent of preferences. Furthermore,
the fact that coalition S ⊆ N can enforce a matching μ  over μ implies that there exists
a sequence of matchings μ0 μ1     μK (where μ0 = μ and μK = μ ) and a sequence
of disjoint pairs {m0 w0}     {mK−1 wK−1} (possibly for some k ∈{ 0 1     K − 1},
4Throughout the paper, we use the notation ⊆ for weak inclusion and   for strict inclusion.
5Notice that this enforceability condition is similar to the enforceability condition deﬁned in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990). That is, a coalition S can enforce the set of marriages in the matching μ  that concerns
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mk = wk)s u c ht h a tf o ra n yk ∈{ 1     K},t h ep a i r{mk−1 wk−1}∈S can enforce the
matching μk over μk−1.
Definition 2. A matching μ is directly dominated by μ ,o rμ<μ  ,i ft h e r ee x i s t sa
coalition S ⊆ N of agents such that μ   i μ ∀i ∈ S and S can enforce μ  over μ.
Deﬁnition 2 gives us the deﬁnition of direct dominance. The direct dominance re-
lation is denoted by <. A matching μ is in the core if there is no subset of agents who,
by rearranging their partnerships only among themselves and possibly dissolving some
partnershipsof μ, canallobtainastrictlypreferredsetofpartners. Formally, amatching
μ is in the core if μ is not directly dominated by any other matching μ  ∈ M.6 Given a
proﬁle P, we denote the set of matchings in the core by C(P). Gale and Shapley (1962)
prove that the core is nonempty. Sotomayor (1996) provides a nonconstructive elemen-
tary proof of the existence of stable marriages.
Another concept used to study one-to-one matching problems is the vNM stable set
(vonNeumannandMorgenstern1944), aset-valuedconceptthatimposesbothinternal
and external stability. A set of matchings is a vNM stable set if (internal stability) no
matching inside the set is directly dominated by a matching belonging to the set, and
(externalstability)anymatchingoutsidethesetisdirectlydominatedbysomematching
belonging to the set.
Definition 3. A set of matchings V ⊆ M is a vNM stable set if the following conditions
are met:
(i) For all μ ∈ V , there does not exist μ  ∈ V such that μ  >μ.
(ii) For all μ  / ∈ V ,t h e r ee x i s t sμ ∈ V such that μ>μ  .
Deﬁnition 3 gives us the deﬁnition of a vNM stable set V( < ) . Ehlers (2007)s t u d i e s
thepropertiesofthevNMstablesetsinone-to-onematchingproblemsusing adifferent
enforceability notion. Given a matching μ, a coalition S ⊆ N is said to be able to enforce
a matching μ  over μ if μ (S) = S. He shows that the core is a subset of any vNM stable
set when using this last enforceability notion.7 Example 1 illustrates his main result.
6Setting |S|≤2 in the deﬁnition of the core, we obtain the concept of pairwise stability deﬁned in Gale
andShapley(1962) thatis equivalentto the core in one-to-onematchings (due to thefactthatthe existence
of any blocking coalition induces the existence of a blocking pair as already mentioned before).
7The notion of enforceability used by Ehlers (2007) is very strong. Let μ be the matching where all
agents are single and let μ  be the matching where μ (m1) = w1, μ (m2) = w2, μ (m3) = w3,   (assuming
|M|=| W |). Let S ={ m1 w1}. Then, according to the enforceability notion of Ehlers (2007), S can enforce
μ  over μ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,S not only enforces being matched together, but its members can also change the
matching structure for all other agents in an arbitrary way. To avoid this arbitrariness, we use another en-
forceability notion. Notice that under our enforceability notion, the vNM stable set in Deﬁnition 3 contains
the vNM stable set deﬁned in Ehlers (2007).504 Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Example 1( Ehlers 2005). Let M ={ m1 m2 m3} and W ={ w1 w2 w3}.L e t P be such
that
P(m1)P ( m 2)P ( m 3) P(w1)P ( w 2)P ( w 3)
w1 w2 w3 m2 m3 m1
w2 w3 w1 m3 m1 m2
m1 m2 m3 w1 w2 w3


















It can be shown that the core contains a unique matching C(P) ={ μ } and that the
unique vNM stable set (when using the notion of enforceability of Ehlers 2007)i s
V( < )={ μ μ  μ  }. ♦
In Example 1, the matchings μ and μ   belong to the unique vNM stable set because
μ  does not directly dominate either μ or μ   even though μ and μ   are not individu-
ally rational matchings (either all women or all men prefer to become single). However,
farsightedwomenmaydecideﬁrsttobecomesingleintheexpectationthatfurthermar-
riages form, leading to μ . Women prefer μ  to μ and once everybody is divorced, men
and women prefer μ  to the situation where everybody is single. A similar reasoning can
be made for μ   with the roles of men and women reversed. Then we may say that (i) μ 
farsightedly dominates μ, (ii) μ  farsightedly dominates μ  , and (iii) V( < )={ μ μ  μ  }
is not a reasonable candidate for being a vNM farsightedly stable set.
In what follows, we use the notion of enforceability given in Deﬁnition 1 unless oth-
erwise mentioned.
3. von Neumann–Morgenstern farsighted stability
The indirect dominance relation is ﬁrst introduced by Harsanyi (1974), but is later for-
malized by Chwe (1994). It captures the idea that coalitions of agents can anticipate the
actions of other coalitions. In other words, the indirect dominance relation captures the
fact that farsighted coalitions consider the end matching that their deviations may lead
to. A matching μ  indirectly dominates μ if μ  can replace μ in a sequence of matchings,
such that at each matching along the sequence, all deviators are strictly better off at the
end matching μ  compared to the status quo they face. Formally, indirect dominance is
deﬁned as follows.
Definition 4. A matching μ is indirectly dominated by μ ,o rμ   μ ,i ft h e r ee x i s t sa
sequence of matchings μ0 μ1     μK (where μ0 = μ and μK = μ ) and a sequence of
coalitions S0 S1     SK−1 such that for any k ∈{ 1     K}, the following conditions are
met:
(i) For all i ∈ Sk−1, μK  i μk−1.Theoretical Economics 6 (2011) vNM farsightedly stable sets 505
(ii) Coalition Sk−1 can enforce the matching μk over μk−1.
Deﬁnition 4 gives us the deﬁnition of indirect dominance. The indirect dominance
relation is denoted by  . Direct dominance is obtained by setting K = 1 in Deﬁnition 4.
Obviously, if μ<μ  ,t h e nμ   μ .
Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) investigate farsighted stability in hedonic games (of
which one-to-one matching problems are a special case), introducing the notion of the
coalitional largest farsighted conservative stable set, which coincides with the largest
consistent set of Chwe (1994).
Definition 5. The set Z( ) ⊆ M is a consistent set if μ ∈ Z( ) if and only if ∀μ  S
such that S can enforce μ  over μ, ∃μ   ∈ Z( ),w h e r eμ  = μ   or μ    μ   such that
μ(i)  ≺i μ  (i) for some i ∈ S. The largest consistent set  (P) is the consistent set that
contains any consistent set.
Interestingly, Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) show that in hedonic games with strict
preferences, (i) any partition belonging to the core indirectly dominates any other par-
tition and (ii) core partitions are always contained in the largest consistent set.8 Thus,
in one-to-one matching markets, for all μ   = μ with μ ∈ C(P),w eh a v et h a tμ   μ  and
C(P) ⊆  (P). However, the largest consistent set may contain more matchings than
those matchings that are in the core as is shown in Example 2.
Example 2. LetM ={ m1 m2 m3} and W ={ w1 w2 w3}.L e tP be such that
P(m1)P ( m 2)P ( m 3) P(w1)P ( w 2)P ( w 3)
w1 w2 w2 m2 m1 m3
w2 w1 w1 m3 m2 m1
w3 w3 w3 m1 m3 m2













Note that μ1 is the unique element in the core of this matching problem and it belongs
to the largest consistent set,  (P). Indeed, since μ1 ∈ C(P),w eh a v et h a tμ1    μ for all
 μ  = μ1.W es h o wn o wt h a t{μ1 μ2} is a consistent set and hence μ2 also belongs to  (P).
To do so, we have to show that ∀μ  Ssuch that S can enforce μ  over μ2, ∃μ ∈{ μ1 μ2},
where μ  = μ or μ    μ,s u c ht h a tμ2(i)  ≺i μ(i) for some i ∈ S. The only proﬁtable devi-
ation from μ2 is the one in which {m3 w1} get married at μ , leaving w3 and m1 single.
Since μ1 ∈ C(P),w eh a v eμ1   μ , and note that one of the deviating players, m3,i sn o t
8The largest consistent set always exists, is nonempty, and satisﬁes external stability (i.e., any matching
outside the set is indirectly dominated by some matching belonging to the set). But a consistent set does
notnecessarilysatisfytheexternalstabilitycondition. Onlythelargestconsistentsetisguaranteedtosatisfy
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betteroffat μ1 comparedto μ2; i.e., μ1(m3) ∼m3 μ2(m3). Consequently, {μ1 μ2} isacon-
sistent set and the largest consistent set may contain matchings that do not belong to
the core. ♦
Another way to introduce farsighted stability is to replace direct by indirect domi-
nance in the deﬁnition of the core. Diamantoudi and Xue (2003)d e ﬁ n et h efarsighted
core (or abstract core) as
C(P  ) ={ μ ∈ M |  μ  ∈ M such that μ    μ} 
Since μ<μ   implies μ   μ ,i tm u s tb et h a tC(P  ) ⊆ C(P). The farsighted core
C(P  ) is too exclusive because it does not consider the credibility of the dominating
alternative and, hence, it can often be empty. For instance, it follows immediately from
the result that any partition belonging to the core indirectly dominates any other parti-
tion, that C(P  ) isemptywhenthereareatleasttwoelementsin C(P). Butevenwhen
C(P)isasingleton, C(P  )canbeempty. InExample2,thematchinginwhichthemen
(m1 m2 m3) are matched to (w1 w2 w3) indirectly dominates the core stable matching
where the men (m1 m2 m3) are matched to (w2 w1 w3) and hence the farsighted core
is empty. The farsighted core exists only when the core is unique and no other matching
indirectlydominatesthecore. Butthisrequiresthatoneneedstorestrictthepreferences
for the farsighted core to exist, and this severely limits its usefulness for general (strict)
preferences.
Now we give the deﬁnition of a vNM farsightedly stableset put forth by Chwe (1994).
Definition 6. A set of matchings V ⊆ M is a vNM farsightedly stable set with respect
to P if the following conditions are met:
(i) For all μ ∈ V , there does not exist μ  ∈ V such that μ    μ.
(ii) For all μ  / ∈ V ,t h e r ee x i s t sμ ∈ V such that μ   μ .
Deﬁnition 6 introduces the notion of a vNM farsightedly stable set V(  ).P a r t ( i )




As shown in Greenberg (1990)a n dXue (1998), the vNM farsightedly stable set as-
sumes optimistic behavior. To see this, suppose that players behave consistently with
indirect dominance and start bargaining, given a matching μ ∈ M as the status quo.
Let M(μ) ={ μ}∪{ μ  ∈ M | μ    μ} denote the set of all possible matchings that can be
9Diamantoudi and Xue (2007) extend the notion of the equilibrium binding agreement (EBA) (see Ray
and Vohra 1997) with unrestrictedcoalitional deviations byusing thevNM stablesetwith the indirect dom-
inance relationship. They study whether the agents reach efﬁcient agreements when they can negotiate
openlyandformcoalitions. Theyshowthat,whiletheextendednotionoftheEBAfacilitatestheattainment
of efﬁcient agreements, inefﬁcient agreements can arise, even if utility transfers are possible. However, no
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reached by means of this bargaining process. Following Greenberg (1990), a standard of
behavior σ is a mapping σ(·) that assigns to each status quo μ,as u b s e to fM(μ) as the
set of possible agreement points. Now consider the stability condition on σ,
μ  ∈ σ(μ) ⇐⇒ μ   ≺S μ   for all μ   ∈ σ( μ) and S can enforce  μ over μ  
where μ   ≺S μ   means that there exists i ∈ S such that μ   i μ  .10 Xue (1998)s h o w st h a t
the set

μ∈Mσ(μ) is a vNM farsightedly stable set V(  ). Indeed, a vNM farsightedly
stable set can be interpreted as a set of matchings that are supported by an optimistic
stablestandardofbehavior,whilethelargestconsistentsetcanbeseenasaconservative
stable standard of behavior (see Chwe 1994). In both stable standards of behavior, when
acoalitiondeviates,itdeviatesfromamatchingtoanothermatchingfromwhichseveral
other matchings might occur. The difference between the two solution concepts is that,
in the vNM farsightedly stable set, coalitions deviate if some possible matching makes
them better off, while in the largest consistent set, coalitions deviate only if all possible
matchings make them better off. Chwe (1994) shows that the vNM farsightedly stable
sets are contained in the largest consistent set. That is, if V(  ) is a vNM farsightedly
stable set, then V(  ) ⊆  (P).
We next reconsider the above examples to show that matchings outside the core,
that belong either to the vNM stable set, V( < ) , or to the largest consistent set,  (P),d o
not survive the stability requirements imposed by introducing farsightedness into the
concept of vNM stable sets.
Example 1 continued. Remember that C(P)={ μ } and that V( < )={ μ μ  μ  } is the
uniquevNMstableset(whenusing thenotion ofenforceabilityof Ehlers2007). Itis easy
to verify that μ    μ and μ    μ  .L e t μ0 = μ, μ1 = ∅ (all agents are single), μ2 = μ ,
S0 ={ w1 w2 w3},a n dS1 = N.W eh a v e( i )μ2   μ0 ∀i ∈ S0 and S0 can enforce μ1 over μ0,
and(ii)μ2   μ1 ∀i ∈ S1 andS1 canenforceμ2 over μ1.T h u s ,μ2   μ0 orμ    μ. Similarly,
it is easy to verify that μ    μ  .H e n c e ,{μ μ  μ  } cannot be a vNM farsightedly stable
set; neither can {μ μ } or {μ  μ  } be a vNM farsightedly stable set since internal stabil-
ity is violated. Moreover, μ does not indirectly dominate μ  and μ   does not indirectly
dominate μ . This implies that the sets {μ μ  }, {μ},o r{μ  } cannot be vNM farsightedly
stable sets, as they violate the external stability condition. In fact, V(  ) ={ μ } is the
unique vNM farsightedly stable set. ♦
Example 2 continued. Remember that μ2 belongs to the largest consistent set but
does not belong to the core. First, we show that {μ2} cannot be a vNM farsightedly sta-
blesetsincetheexternalstabilityconditionwouldbeviolated. Indeed, μ2 doesnotindi-
rectly dominate the matching μ3 where men (m1 m2 m3) are matched to (w2 w3 w1).
Second, we show that a set composed of μ2 and other matching(s) cannot be a vNM far-
sightedly stableset. Tedious calculationsshow thatthereare only threeothermatchings
that are not indirectly dominated by μ2 and vice versa: these are the ones in which men
(m1 m2 m3) are matched to (m1 w3 w1), (w3 m2 w1),a n d(m1 m2 w1), respectively.
10Note that σ is not necessarily unique.508 Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
These three matchings are the only ones that can belong to a vNM farsightedly stable
set containing μ2, but none of these indirectly dominates the matching μ3, violating ex-
ternal stability. Thus, the largest consistent set may contain more matchings than those
matchings that belong to the vNM farsightedly stable sets. ♦
4. Main results
4.1 Characterization results
From Deﬁnition 6,w eh a v et h a tf o rV(  ) to be a singleton vNM farsightedly stable set,
only external stability needs to be veriﬁed. That is, the set {μ} is a vNM farsightedly
stable set if and only if, for all μ   = μ,w eh a v et h a tμ   μ .
Toshowourmainresults,weuseLemma1,whichshowsthatanindividuallyrational
matching μ indirectly dominates μ  if and only if there does not exist a pair {i μ (i)}
that blocks μ. In other words, an individually rational matching μ does not indirectly
dominate another matching μ  if and only if there exists a pair {i μ (i)} that blocks μ.
Lemma 1. Consider any two matchings μ  μ∈ M such that μ is individually rational.
Then μ   μ  if and only if there does not exist a pair {i μ (i)} such that both i and μ (i)
prefer μ  to μ.
The proof of this lemma, as well as all other proofs, can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. Consider any two matchings μ  μ∈ M such that μ  is individually rational.
Then μ   μ  implies that μ is also individually rational.
The next theorem shows that every matching in the core is a vNM farsightedly stable
set.
Theorem1. Ifμisamatchinginthecore, μ ∈ C(P),then{μ}isavNMfarsightedlystable
set, {μ}=V(  ).
Since μ is in the core, there is no pair of players matched in any other matching μ 
suchthattheybothpreferμ  toμ.T h e nLemma1appliesandμindirectlydominatesany
other matching μ . Thus, it follows that if μ ∈ C(P),t h e n{μ} is a vNM farsightedly stable
set.11 But, a priori, there may be other vNM farsightedly stable sets of matchings. We
now show that the only possible vNM farsightedly stable sets are singleton sets whose
elements are in the core.
Theorem 2. If V(  ) ⊆ M is a vNM farsightedly stable set of matchings, then V(  ) =
{μ} with μ ∈ C(P).
11Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) are the ﬁrst to show that in hedonic games (of which marriage problems
areaspecialcase)withstrictpreferences,anypartitionbelongingtothecoreindirectlydominatesanyother
partition. Here, weprovideanalternativeproofoftheirresultforone-to-onematchingproblemswithstrict
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We here provide a sketch of the proof. Because of Theorem 1, it is clear that if V(  )
has more than one element and has a nonempty intersection with the core C(P),t h e n
internal stability is violated, since any element of the core indirectly dominates any
othermatching. Second,ifV(  ) ={ μ}withμ/ ∈ C(P),thenthereexistsadeviatingcoali-
tionthatcanenforceanewmatchinginwhichallcoalitionmembersarebetteroff. Then
this new matching cannot be indirectly dominated by μ and hence external stability is
violated. A third possibility is that V(  ) has more than one element and has an empty
intersection with C(P). In this case, we pick any element μ1 of V(  ) and construct a
deviation to a matching μ 
1 such that no blocking pair of μ1 blocks μ 
1. We ﬁrst show that
μ 
1 always exists. Next, to satisfy external stability, there must be a μ2 ∈ V(  ) such that
μ2   μ 
1. We then show that internal stability cannot be satisﬁed whenever μ2   μ 
1:
either μ2   μ1 or μ1   μ2. In particular, we prove ﬁrst that if μ2 does not contain any
blocking pair of μ1,t h e n ,b yLemma 1,e i t h e rμ1   μ2 (if μ1 is individually rational) or
μ2   μ1 (if μ1 is not individually rational). Second, if μ2 does contain some blocking
pair of μ1 (and hence μ1    μ2), we prove that μ2   μ1,b e c a u s eμ2 also indirectly dom-
inates the matching that we obtain from μ1 by means of the deviation of the blocking
pairs that are still matched at μ2. Therefore, we can conclude that there does not exist
a vNM farsightedly stable set V(  ) containing more than one matching and satisfying
V(  )∩C(P)= ∅. We refer the reader to the Appendix for a detailed proof. Hence, while
Ehlers (2007) shows that the set of matchings in the core is a subset of vNM (myopically)
stable sets, vNM farsightedly stable sets cannot include matchings that are not in the
core.12
Notice that our results also hold if only pairwise deviations are allowed in the
deﬁnition of indirect dominance. Indeed, as mentioned before, the fact that coali-
tion S ⊆ N can enforce a matching μ  over μ implies that there exists a sequence of
matchings μ0 μ1     μK (where μ0 = μ and μK = μ ) and a sequence of disjoint pairs
{m0 w0}     {mK−1 wK−1} (possibly for some k ∈{ 0     K− 1}, mk = wk)s u c ht h a tf o r
any k ∈{ 1     K},t h ep a i r{mk−1 wk−1} can enforce the matching μk over μk−1.H e n c e ,
any deviation of a blocking coalition S from μ to μ  can be replaced by a sequence of
pairwise deviations of the disjoint blocking pairs contained in S.
4.2 Discussion
Konishi and Ray (2003) study a model of dynamic coalition formation where individuals
are farsighted and evaluate the desirability of a move in terms of its consequences on
the entire discounted stream of payoffs. Contrary to ours, their model is in spirit closer
tonon-cooperativegametheory. Theymodeltheformationofcoalitionsbymeansofan
intertemporal Markovian process of coalition formation (PCF). A PCF is an equilibrium
(EPCF) if a coalitional move from one state to another, as speciﬁed by the PCF, yields
12The notion of bargaining set for one-to-one matching problems deﬁned by Klijn and Massó (2003)i sa
ﬁrst attempt to reﬂect the idea that agents are not myopic. The bargaining set is the set of matchings that
have no justiﬁed objection. Klijn and Massó show that the set of core stable matchings is a subset of the
bargaining set. So, contrary to the vNM farsightedly stable set, the bargaining set can contain matchings
outside the core.510 Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
its members higher discounted future payoffs instead of remaining inactive under the
ongoing state. Thus, Konishi and Ray (2003) introduce farsightedness by letting the im-
portance of future payoffs, according to some PCF, vary. In the limit, when the discount
factor approaches 1, agents only care about the payoffs received in the (set of) state(s)
an EPCF converges to. Note that one can consider the set of absorbing states of a deter-
ministic EPCF as a stable set for that EPCF: once in an absorbing state, an EPCF stays
there (internal stability) and for each state that is not absorbing, there exists a path to
some absorbing state (external stability).
Konishi and Ray show that, for a class of games that can be characterized by a char-
acteristic function, the class of deterministic13 EPCFs with a unique limit state charac-
terizes the core, provided the discount factor approaches 1. When the discount factor
is high enough, (i) for any element of the core, there exists a deterministic EPCF with
that core element as its unique limit (Theorem 4.1); (ii) any deterministic EPCF with a
unique limit must be such that the limit belongs to the core (Theorem 4.2).
We argue that the idea of an EPCF with a set of absorbing states when discounting
vanishes is closely related to the idea of farsightedly stable sets. In fact, indirect domi-
nancecanbeconsideredtobethelimitofsuchaprocessofcoalitionformationinwhich
people care only about the end state. In particular, if an absorbing state of an EPCF is
reachable from a given matching μ for a range of discount factors close to 1, then the
absorbing state indirectly dominates matching μ. We can now relateour results to those
of Konishi and Ray (2003). Our Theorem 1 is very similar to Theorem 4.1 in Konishi and
Ray (2003): any core matching is a singleton farsightedly stable set or, in the terms of
Konishi and Ray (2003), there exists an EPCF that has this core matching as its unique
limitwhenthediscountfactorapproaches1. Theorem4.2providestheconverse: ifthere
is a deterministic EPCF with a unique limit when the discount factor approaches 1, then
this limit must belong to the core. In our setting, this is stated as follows: if there is a
matching that indirectly dominates all other matchings, and hence forms a singleton
vNM farsightedly stable set, then this matching must be in the core. But our Theorem 2
says more. The fact that a singleton vNM farsightedly stable set must be a core element
is not enough to characterize all farsightedly stable sets in the matching problem. Our
Theorem 2 says that there can be no other vNM farsightedly stable sets. Their Theorems
4.1 and 4.2 remain silent about other (deterministic) EPCF when the discount factor ap-
proaches 1. Our Theorem 2 may prove useful in understanding and characterizing all
EPCF of the matching problem when discounting vanishes.14
13Konishi and Ray (2003) deﬁne a PCF to be deterministic if, for all states, the probability of moving from
one state to another is degenerate. A state is absorbing if the probability of moving to any other state is
equal to zero. A PCF is absorbing if, for each state, there is a positive probability to move, after a ﬁnite
amount of steps, to an absorbing state. A PCF has a unique limit if it is absorbing and possesses a single
absorbing state.
14Roth and Vande Vate (1990) demonstrate that, starting from an arbitrary matching, the process of al-
lowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to match converges to a matching in the core with probability 1 in
the marriage problem. Relative to this, Jackson and Watts(2002) show that if preferencesare strict, then the
set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the core. But both papers propose a dynamic process
in which blocking pairs form and disappear based on the improvement that the resulting matching offers
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We show that the vNM farsightedly stable set, the farsighted core, and the largest
consistent set can lead to very different conclusions in one-to-one matching problems.
We characterize the vNM farsightedly stable sets to be singleton sets that contain a core
element. One interesting question is whether one can ﬁnd restrictions on the prefer-
ences such that all the above concepts agree. Note that they coincide only if the core has
a unique element. One popular restriction that guarantees uniqueness of the core is the
top-coalition property, introduced by Banerjee et al. (2001).
Given a nonempty set of agents T ⊆ N, a coalition S ⊆ T is a top coalition of T if, for
every i ∈ S, he or she is matched to his or her most preferred partner in T. A matching
problem (M W P)satisﬁes the top-coalition property if, for any nonempty set of play-
ers T ⊆ N, there exists a top coalition of T. This implies that for any group of agents
who can match, there are always two agents that top rank each other (or prefer to re-
main single). Banerjee et al. (2001) show that when this condition is satisﬁed, the core
hasauniqueelementthatisequaltothetopcoalitionpartition μ∗ ={ S1 S2     Sk}with
Si = (mi μ∗(mi)) for all i ∈ M such that coalition S1 is a top coalition of N, coalition S2





j≤kSj = ∅. Note that if mi is single in μ∗,t h e nμ∗(mi) = mi.
We now introduce Lemma 3 to show that when preferences satisfy the top-coalition
property, the vNM farsightedly stable set, the farsighted core, and the largest consis-
tent set coincide with the core. Lemma 3 asserts that the top-coalition partition is not
indirectly dominated by any other matching.
Lemma 3. If (M W P)satisﬁes the top-coalition property, then   μ ∈ M such that μ  
μ∗,w h e r eμ∗ is the top coalition partition.
From Lemma 3, we immediately obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If (M W P)satisﬁes the top-coalition property and μ∗ is the unique core
element, then {μ∗} is the unique vNM farsightedly stable set, the farsighted core, and the
largest consistent set.
The next example shows that the vNM stable set with the direct dominance rela-
tion based on the notion of enforceability of Deﬁnition 1 can contain elements outside
the core even when the preferences satisfy the top-coalition property. Thus, the top-
coalition property is not enough to guarantee that direct and indirect dominance coin-
cide.
Example 3. LetM ={ m1 m2} and W ={ w1 w2}.L e tP be such that
P(m1)P ( m 2) P(w1)P ( w 2)
w1 w1 m1 m2
w2 w2 m2 m1













Note that μ∗ is the unique element in the core of this matching problem. But μ∗ ≯ μ ,
since m2 would block the deviation of the grand coalition from μ  to μ∗.H e n c e ,
μ  ∈ V( < ) .I nf a c t ,V( < )={ μ∗ μ }. ♦
However, notice that μ∗ is the unique element of the vNM stable set if we use the
Ehlers’( 2007) notion of enforceability, because then the coalition S ={ m1 w1} can en-
force the matching μ∗ from μ ,w i t hμ∗  i μ  ∀i ∈ S. Indeed, it can be shown that if
(M W P)satisﬁes the top-coalition property, then the vNM stable set with the direct
dominance relation based on the Ehlers’( 2007) notion of enforceability coincides with
the core. But, in general, the core is a subset of any vNM stable set (see Theorem 2 of
Ehlers 2007).
5. Many-to-one matching problems
A many-to-one matching problem consists of a set of N agents divided into a set of hos-
pitals, H ={ h1     hr}, and a set of medical students, I ={ i1     is}, where possibly
r  = s. Each hospital h ∈ H has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation P(h)
over the set of all subsets of I, including the empty set, which represents the prospect of
having all its positions unﬁlled. Each medical student i ∈ I has a strict, transitive, and
complete preference relation P(i)over H ∪{ i}. Preferences proﬁles are (r + s)-tuples of
preference relations; we denote them by P = (P(h1)     P(hr);P(i1)     P(is)).
Given a hospital’s preference relation, P(h), the sets of medical students that h
prefers to the empty set are called acceptable; thus we allow that hospital h may prefer
nottoenrollanymedicalstudentratherthantoenrollunacceptablesubsetsofstudents.
Similarly, given a medical student’s preference relation P(i), the hospitals preferred by i
tothepossibilityofbeingunemployedarecalledacceptable;inthiscase,weareallowing
thatstudenti mayprefertoremainunemployedratherthantoworkforanunacceptable
hospital. It turns out that only acceptable partners matter, so we write preference rela-
tion concisely as lists of acceptable partners. For example, P(hi) ={ i1 i3} {i2} {i1} {i3}
indicates that {i1 i3}  hi {i2}  hi {i1}  hi {i3}  hi ∅ and P(ij) = h2 h1 ij indicates that
h2  ij h1  ij ij. We denote by R the weak orders associated with P.S ohi  i hj if hi ∼i hj
or hi  i hj,a n ds i m i l a r l yf o rR(h). A many-to-one matching problem is simply (H I P).
A matching μ is a mapping from the set H ∪I into the set of all subsets of H ∪I such
that for all i ∈ I and h ∈ H, (i) either |μ(i)|=1 and μ(i) ⊆ H or else μ(i) = i, (ii) μ(h) ∈ 2I,
and (iii) μ(i) ={ h} if and only if i ∈ μ(h).G i v e n (H I P), we denote by M the set of
all matchings. Let P be a preference proﬁle. Given a set S ⊆ I,l e tC h (S P(h)) denote
hospital h’s most preferred subset of S according to its preference ordering P(h).W ec a l l
Ch(S P(h)) t h ec h o i c es e to fS according to P(h).T h a ti s ,S  = Ch(S P(h)) if and only if
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Definition7. Ahospitalh’spreferenceorderingP(h)satisﬁessubstitutabilityifforany
set S ⊆ I containing students i and i  (i  = i ), if i ∈ Ch(S P(h)),t h e ni ∈ Ch(S \{i } P(h)).
A preference proﬁle P is substitutable if, for each hospital h, the preference ordering
P(h)satisﬁes substitutability.
That is, if h has substitutable preferences, then if its preferred set of students from S
includes i, so does its preferred set of students from any subset of S that still includes i.
We assume that hospitals’ preferences satisfy the property of substitutability.15
Let P b eap r e f e r e n c ep r o ﬁ l ea n dl e tμ be a matching. We say that μ is individu-
ally rational if μ(i)  i i for all i ∈ I and if μ(h) = Ch(μ(h) P(h)) for all h ∈ H.T h a ti s ,
μ is individually rational if no agent can unilaterally improve over its assignment in μ
(students by choosing to remain unemployed and hospitals by ﬁring some of their stu-
dents). A student–hospital pair (i h) blocks μ if i/ ∈ μ(h), i ∈ Ch(μ(h) ∪{ i} P(h)),a n d
h  i μ(i); i.e., if i and h are not matched through μ, hospital h wants to enroll i (possibly
after ﬁring some of its current students in μ(h))a n ds t u d e n ti prefers hospital h over her
current match μ(i).Ap a i r(S h) ∈ 2I × H blocks∗ μ if h  i μ(i) for all i ∈ S and there is
S  ⊆ μ(h) such that [S  ∪ S]  h μ(h).I nw o r d s ,(S h) blocks∗ μ if hospital h is willing to
enroll the students in S (possibly after ﬁring some of its current students in μ(h))a n da l l
students i in S prefer h over their current match μ(i). This notion of blocking was used
by Echenique and Oviedo (2004).
Definition 8. A matching μ is stable if it is individually rational and there is no
student–hospital pair that blocks μ. A matching μ is stable∗ if it is individually rational
and there is no pair (S h) that blocks∗ μ.
Given a preference proﬁle P, we denote the set of stable matchings by  (P) and de-
note the set of stable∗ matchings by  ∗(P). Echenique and Oviedo (2004) show that
 ∗(P) ⊆  (P). Given a preference proﬁle P,t h estrong core is the set of matchings μ
for which there is no H  ⊆ H, I  ⊆ I with H  ∪ I   = ∅,a n dμ  ∈ M such that (i) for all
i ∈ I  and h ∈ H , μ (i) ∈ H  and μ (h) ⊆ I ; (ii) for all i ∈ I  and h ∈ H , μ (i)  i μ(i)
and μ (h)  h μ(h); and (iii) there is j ∈ H  ∪ I  with μ (j)  j μ(j). We denote by
Cw(P) the strong core. According to this deﬁnition, members of the deviating coali-
tion need only to be weakly better off and one member needs to be strictly better off.16
Echenique and Oviedo (2004) show that the set of stable∗ matchings equals the strong
core:  ∗(P) = Cw(P). However, the strong core may not coincide with the core (see Roth
and Sotomayor 1990).17
Let Sμ(h) denote the power set of the set μ(h). We now adapt the deﬁnition of en-
forceability to many-to-one matching problems.
15A hospital’s preferences over group of students are responsive if, for any two assignments that differ in
only one student, it prefers the assignment containing the more preferred student. Note that responsive
preferences have the substitutability property.
16On the contrary, in the deﬁnition of the core, all members of the deviating coalition should be strictly
better off.
17Roth and Sotomayor (1990) show that if hospitals’ preferences are substitutable, then the set of stable
matchings,  (P), equals the strong core. In one-to-one matching problems with strict preferences, the set
of stable matchings coincides with the core, which is equal to the strong core.514 Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
Definition 9. Given a matching μ, a coalition S ⊆ N is said to be able to enforce a
matching μ  over μ if thefollowing conditions hold: (i) μ (h) / ∈ Sμ(h)∪{h} implies μ (h)\
μ(h) ∪{ h}⊂S and (ii) μ (h) ∈ Sμ(h) ∪{ h}, μ (h)  = μ(h), implies either h or μ(h) \ μ (h)
or h together with a nonempty subset of μ(h)\μ (h) should be in S.
Condition(i)saysthatanynewmatchin μ  thatcontainsdifferentpartnersthanin μ
should be such that h and the different partners of h belong to S. Condition (ii) states
that so as to leave some (or all) positions of one existing match in μ unﬁlled, either h
or the students leaving such positions or h and some nonempty subset of such students
should be in S.18
We now provide a condition that characterizes indirect dominance in many-to-one
matching problems. Similarly to one-to-one matching problems, we have that an indi-
vidually rational matching μ indirectly dominates μ  if and only if there does not exist
ap a i r(S h) ∈ 2I × H,w i t hS ⊆ μ (h),t h a tblocks∗ μ. In other words, an individually ra-
tional matching μ does not indirectly dominate another matching μ  if and only if there
exists a pair (S h) that blocks∗ μ.
Lemma 4. Consider any two individually rational matchings μ  μ∈ M.T h e nμ   μ  if
and only if there does not exist a pair (S h) ∈ 2I × H,w i t hS ⊆ μ (h),t h a tb l o c k s ∗ μ; i.e.,
such that h  i μ(i) for all i ∈ S and there is S  ⊆ μ(h) such that [S  ∪S]  h μ(h).
In the following discussion, we extend our characterization of the vNM farsightedly
stable set for one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems with
substitutable preferences. Indeed, when preferences are substitutable, Roth and So-
tomayor(1990)showthatthesetofstablematchings(thatcoincideswiththestrongcore
and with the set of stable∗ matchings) is always nonempty. We now show that the only
possible vNM farsightedly stable sets are singleton sets whose elements are the stable∗
matchings.
Theorem 3. In a many-to-one matching problem with substitutable preferences, a set of
matchings is a vNMfarsightedly stableset if and onlyif it isa singletonset and its element
belongs to the strong core Cw(P).
The proof of Theorem 3 follows the proof of Theorem 2 but replacing now Lemma 1
by Lemma 4 and proving that μ 
1 always exists. Thus, our characterization of the
vNM farsightedly stable set for one-to-one matching problems extends to many-to-one
matching problems with substitutable preferences. This result contrasts with Ehlers
(2007), who shows that there need not be any relationship between the vNM stable
sets of a many-to-one matching problem with responsive preferences and its associated
18Roth and Sotomayor (1990) use another deﬁnition of enforceability so as to deﬁne when a matching
weaklydominatesanothermatching. TheonlydifferenceisthatCondition(i)inRothandSotomayor(1990)
says that any new match in μ  that contains different partners than in μ should be such that h and the part-
ners of h in μ  (that is, μ (h) instead μ (h)\μ(h))b e l o n gt oS. Since in the deﬁnition of indirect dominance,
we impose that all the deviators are strictly better off, here we require only the different partners of h to
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one-to-one matching problem. We also show that if there is a matching of a many-to-
one matching problem with substitutable preferences that is in the core but not in the
strong core, then this matching is never a vNM farsightedly stable set.
6. Conclusion
WecharacterizethevNMfarsightedlystablesetsinone-to-onematchingproblems: aset
of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its
element is in the core. Thus, we provide an alternative characterization of the core in
one-to-onematchingproblems. Finally,weshowthatourmainresultisrobusttomany-
to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences: a set of matchings is a vNM
farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton set and its element is in the strong
core.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.L e t B(μ  μ)be the set of men and women who are strictly better
off in μ than in μ . Accordingly, let I(μ  μ)and W( μ   μ)be the set of men and women
who are indifferent between μ and μ , and worse off in μ than in μ , respectively.
(⇒) Assume, to the contrary, that μ   μ  and that there is a pair {i μ (i)} such that
both prefer μ  to μ.F o rμ to indirectly dominate μ ,i tm u s tb et h a ti or μ (i) get
divorced along the path from μ  to μ. But both i and μ (i) belong to W( μ   μ),
and then they never divorce. Hence μ    μ , a contradiction.
(⇐)W e p r o v e ⇐ by showing that μ   μ  if the above condition is satisﬁed. Assume
that for all pairs {i μ (i)} such that μ (i)  = μ(i),e i t h e ri or μ (i) or both belong to
B(μ  μ). Noticethateveryagenti singleinμ  thatacceptsamatchwithsomeone
else in μ also belongs to B(μ  μ)since μ is individually rational. Next construct
the following sequence of matchings from μ  to μ: μ0 μ1 μ2 (where μ0 = μ ,
μ1 ={ μ1(i) = i, μ1(μ (i)) = μ (i) for all i ∈ B(μ  μ),a n dμ1(j) = μ (j) otherwise},
and μ2 = μ). Also construct the following sequence of coalitions S0 S1 with
S0 = B(μ  μ)and S1 = B(μ  μ)∪{ μ(i) for i ∈ B(μ  μ)}. Then coalition S0 can
enforce μ1 over μ0 and coalition S1 canenforce μ2 over μ1.M o r e o v e r ,μ2   μ0 for
S0 and μ2   μ1 for S1 because every mate of i ∈ B(μ  μ)in μ2 (in μ)a l s op r e f e r s
his or her mate in μ2 to being single in μ1. Indeed, for every i ∈ B(μ  μ),e i t h e r
μ2(i) ∈ B(μ  μ), and hence both prefer μ2 to μ1,o rμ2(i) ∈ W( μ   μ).I nt h i sl a s t
case, μ2(i) must have lost his or her mate in μ0 and μ0(μ2(i)) must belong to
B(μ  μ)since otherwise μ0(μ2(i)) and μ2(i) would form a blocking pair of μ2,
and this, by assumption, is not possible. Hence μ2(i) must be single in μ1.T h e n
since μ2 isindividuallyrational, μ2(i) mustpreferacceptinghisorhermatein μ2
to remaining single at μ1.S o ,w eh a v et h a tμ   μ .  
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose not. Then there exists i ∈ N that prefers to be single than
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either single at μ  or matched to μ (i)  i i. But then in the sequence of moves between
μ  and μ,t h eﬁ r s tt i m ei has to move she/he was either matched with μ (i) or single
and, hence, i cannot belong to a coalition Sk−1 that can enforce the matching μk over
μk−1 and such that all members of Sk−1 prefer μ to μk−1, contradicting the fact that
μ   μ .  
Proof of Theorem 1. We only need to verify condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 6:f o r a l l
μ   = μ,w eh a v et h a tμ   μ . Since μ ∈ C(P), we know that ∀μ   = μ,   i ∈ M and j ∈ W
such that μ (i) = j and μ    μ for both i and j. Since μ is individually rational, we have
from Lemma 1 that μ   μ .  
Proof of Theorem 2. Notice that if V(  ) ⊆ C(P),t h e nV(  ) is a vNM farsightedly
stable set only if V(  ) is a singleton set {μ} with μ ∈ C(P).F r o mTheorem 1, we know
that for all μ   = μ, μ   μ . Suppose now that V(  )   C(P). Then, either V(  )∩C(P) =
∅ or V(  )∩C(P)= ∅.
Suppose ﬁrst that V(  ) ∩ C(P)  = ∅.L e t μ ∈ V(  ) ∩ C(P),a n dμ  ∈ V(  ) with
μ  / ∈ C(P).T h e n , b y Theorem 1,w eh a v et h a tμ   μ , violating the internal stability
condition.
Suppose now that V(  ) ∩ C(P) = ∅. Then we show that V(  ) is not a vNM far-
sightedly stable set because either the internal stability condition (condition (i) in Deﬁ-
nition 6) or the external stability condition (condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 6) is violated.
Assume ﬁrst that V(  ) ={ μ} is a singleton. Since μ/ ∈ C(P), there exists a deviating
coalition S in μ and a matching μ  ∈ M such that μ   i μ for all i ∈ S and S can enforce
μ  over μ.T h e nμ    μ  and the external stability condition is violated.
Assume now that V(  ) contains more than one matching that does not belong to
C(P). Take any matching μ1 ∈ V(  ). Since μ1 / ∈ C(P), there exists at least a pair of
agents {i j} such that μ1(j)  = i (or a single agent {i}) and a matching μ 
1 ∈ M such that
μ 
1   μ1 for both i and j (or μ 
1   μ1 for i), and {i j} (or i) can enforce μ 
1 over μ1, i.e.,
such that μ 
1(j) = i (or μ 
1(i) = i). Let S(μ1) be the set of blocking pairs of μ1.C o n s i d e r
the deviation from μ1 to μ 
1 of the subset of blocking pairs S (μ1) ⊆ S(μ1),w h e r eS (μ1)
contains the maximum number of blocking pairs and is such that the subset S(μ1) \
S (μ1) does not contain any blocking pair of μ 
1. W eﬁ r s tp r o v et h a ts u c ham a t c h i n g
always exists.
Claim 1. For any matching μ1 / ∈ C(P), there always exists a matching μ 
1 ∈ M that di-
rectly dominates μ1 and that can be enforced over μ1 by the blocking pairs S (μ1),a n d
such that μ 
1 is not blocked by any pair in S(μ1)\S (μ1).
Proof. We prove the existence of μ 
1 by construction. Deﬁne M  to be the set of men
whobelongtosomeblockingpairof μ: M  ={ i ∈ M |∃ j ∈ W ∪{i} suchthat {i j}∈S(μ1)}.
Equally, deﬁne W   to be the set of women who belong to some blocking pair of μ1: W   =
{j ∈ W |∃ i ∈ M ∪{j} such that {i j}∈S(μ1)}.
Consider the following restricted matching problem in which each agent only ranks
those agents with whom he or she can form a deviating blocking pair. That is, the pref-
erences of each i ∈ M  are only over the set W  
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For each j ∈ W  , her preferences are restricted to the set M 
j ={ i ∈ M  ∪{ j} such that
{i j}∈S(μ1)}.L e tP (μ1) denote these restricted preferences. Then the matching prob-
lem {M  W  P (μ1)} has at least one stable matching (since it is a marriage market), call
it μ .
We deﬁne μ 
1 andS (μ1)asfollows. ConsiderﬁrsttheagentsinM  andW  .E v e r yp a i r
{i μ (i)} in μ  (possibly i = μ (i)) such that both prefer their partner in μ  to their partner
in μ1 belongs to S (μ1) and, hence, both i and μ (i) move from μ1 to μ 
1 becoming a cou-
ple (as in μ ). Every single agent at μ  preferring being married at μ1 rather than being
singleatμ  doesnotbelongtoS (μ1),buttoS(μ1)\S (μ1).E v e r yp a i r{i μ1(i)}in μ1 with
μ1(i) = μ (i) is such that i (and/or μ1(i)) belongs to S(μ1)\S (μ1) when i (and/or μ1(i))
belongstoM  (belongstoW  ). ConsidernowallagentswhodonotbelongtoeitherM  or
W  . They do not belong to a pair of S (μ1) (they do not move themselves, although they
can lose their match in the move from μ1 to μ 
1 if they were initially matched to some
of the deviating players in some of the pairs of S (μ1)). Clearly, the subset S(μ1)\S (μ1)
does not contain any blocking pair of μ 
1, because otherwise μ  would not be a stable
matching for the restricted matching problem {M  W  P (μ1)}. Since the set of single
agents in any stable matching is always the same, then S (μ1) contains the maximum
possible number of blocking pairs such that S(μ1) \ S (μ1) does not contain any block-
ing pair of μ 
1.  
Now, for V(  ) to be a vNM farsightedly stable set, we need the following conditions
to be satisﬁed:
(i) For any other matching μ2 ∈ V(  ), μ2  = μ1, it should be that μ1    μ2 and μ2   
μ1.
(ii) For all μ  / ∈ V(  ), there should exist μ ∈ V(  ) such that μ   μ  (in particular, we
needthatthereexistsamatching μ2 ∈ V(  ) suchthat μ2   μ 
1 foreachmatching,
like μ 
1, that can be enforced by any subset of blocking pairs of any matching in
V(  )).
We show that a V(  ) containing more than one matching, none of them in C(P),i s
not a vNM farsightedly stable set because one of the above conditions is not satisﬁed.
Let μ1 ∈ V(  ). We know by Claim 1 that there exists a matching μ 
1 that can be
enforced from μ1 by the blocking pairs in S (μ1) and such that μ 
1 >μ 1 (and μ1    μ 
1).
Notice that μ 
1 / ∈ V(  ). By condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 6, there exists a matching μ2 ∈
V(  ) suchthat μ2   μ 
1. Condition (i) in Deﬁnition6 impliesthat μ1    μ2 and μ2    μ1.
We prove that condition (i) is violated. Two cases should be considered.
1. Assume that μ2 does not contain any blocking pair of μ1; i.e.,  {i μ2(i)} such that
{i μ2(i)}∈S(μ1).I fμ1 is individually rational, we have by Lemma 1 that μ1   μ2,
violating condition (i) in Deﬁnition 6.O t h e r w i s e ,i fμ1 is not individually rational,
consider the deviation from μ1 to μ  
1,w h e r ea n ya g e n ti who prefers being single
to being married to μ1(i),d i v o r c e sf r o mμ1(i), while the other agents do not move.
Then μ  
1 >μ 1 (and μ1    μ  
1). By condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 6,t h e r ee x i s t sam a t c h -
ing μ2 ∈ V(  ) such that μ2   μ  
1. But then we also have that μ2   μ1, since the518 Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote Theoretical Economics 6 (2011)
agents who divorce from μ1 to μ  
1 never marry someone else and become worse off
than being single. Hence, the internal stability condition is violated and V(  ) is
not a vNM farsightedly stable set. So V(  ) cannot contain nonindividually ratio-
nal matchings.
2. Assume that μ2 contains some blocking pair(s) of μ1;t h a ti s ,∃{i μ2(i)} such that
{i μ2(i)}∈S(μ1). Notice that, in this case, we have by Lemma 1 that μ1    μ2.L e t
S  (μ1) ⊆ S(μ1) be the set of blocking pairs of μ1 that are still matched in μ2.C o n -
sider the deviation from μ1 to μ  
1, where only the blocking pairs {i j}∈S  (μ1) ⊆
S(μ1) get married. Then μ  
1 >μ 1 (and μ1    μ  
1)a n dμ 
1 >μ   
1 (if μ  
1  = μ 
1). Since
μ2   μ 
1,wealsohavethatμ2   μ  
1,becausetheonlydifferencebetween μ 
1 and μ  
1
is that at μ 
1, the rest of the blocking pairs of μ1 (who are not still matchedat μ  
1 and
who divorce from μ 
1 to μ2) get married. Hence, μ  
1 does not contain any blocking
pair of μ2. Then, since μ2   μ  
1, we also have that μ2   μ1, violating condition (i)
in Deﬁnition 6.  
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose to the contrary that there exists a matching μ with μ  = μ∗
andsuchthatμ   μ∗. Takethelowestj suchthatSj isthetopcoalitionofN\

l<j Sl and
mj is better off in μ.T h e nmj must be matched in μ to μ∗(ml) for some l<j.O t h e r w i s e
Sj would not be a top coalition of N \

l<j Sl.M o r e o v e r ,μ∗(ml) must be worse off in μ
compared to μ∗, because, otherwise, (mj μ∗(ml)) would be a blocking pair of μ∗.B u t
then ml must be better off in μ, because, otherwise, (ml μ∗(ml)) = Sl blocks μ.B u tt h e n
ml is better off in μ and l<j, a contradiction.  
ProofofLemma4.( ⇒) Assumetothecontrarythatμ   μ  andthatthereexistsapair
(S h) ∈ 2I ×H that blocks∗ μ.T h a ti s ,t h ep a i r(S h) is such that h  i μ(i) for all
i ∈ S, S ⊆ μ (h),a n dt h e r ei sS  ⊆ μ(h) (S  ⊆ μ (h))s u c ht h a t[S  ∪ S]  h μ(h).A t
no step along the path between μ  and μ does any i ∈[ S  ∪ S] leave h.S o ,a l o n g
the path between μ  and μ, hospital h must at some point get rid of any i ∈ S.
Since μ  is individually rational and [S  ∪ S]  h μ(h),t h e nμ (h)  h μ(h) and h
never initiates a move at μ  so as to go to μ. Hence, some or all of the students
in μ (h) \[ S  ∪ S] who prefer μ to μ  leave h. Since μ  is individually rational,
any intermediate matching obtained once some students in μ (h)\[S  ∪S] leave
h between μ  and the matching in which h is only matched to [S  ∪ S],a r ea l l
preferred by h to this last matching in which h is matched to [S  ∪ S].S oa ta n y
step along the path between μ  and the matching in which h is only matched to
[S ∪S], h is in a betterposition comparedto μ.B u tt h e nh never hasan incentive
to get rid of any i ∈ S.H e n c eμ    μ , a contradiction.
(⇐)W e p r o v e ⇐ by construction. In the ﬁrst step, let anyone (student or hospital) get
ridofallmatchesinμ  iftheyarebetteroffatμ. Afterthisstep,onlyhospitalsthat
are (weakly) worse off at μ compared to μ  may still have some students they are
matched to (called it Sh with Sh ⊆ μ (h) for some h). In the second step, let these
hospitals get rid of all their matches (all i ∈ Sh). They want to do so, since, by
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the second step, everyone is alone. In the third step, allow all matches necessary
to obtain μ. This is possible since μ is individually rational.  
Proof of Theorem 3. First, we prove that (i) if μ is in the strong core, μ ∈ Cw(P),t h e n
{μ} is a vNM farsightedly stable set, {μ}=V(  ). Second, we prove that (ii) if V(  ) ⊆ M
is a vNM farsightedly stable set of matchings, then V(  ) ={ μ} with μ ∈ Cw(P).
(i) We only need to verify condition (ii) in Deﬁnition 6:f o ra l lμ   = μ,w eh a v et h a t
μ   μ . Since μ ∈ Cw(P) =  ∗(P), we know that ∀μ   = μ, there does not exist a
pair (S h) ∈ 2I × H,w i t hS ⊆ μ (h),s u c ht h a th  i μ(i) for all i ∈ S,a n dt h e r ei s
S  ⊆ μ(h) (S  ⊆ μ (h))s u c ht h a t[S  ∪ S]  h μ(h). Since μ is individually rational,
we have from Lemma 4 that μ   μ .
(ii) The proof runs exactly along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 2 by simply
provingthatV(  )cannotcontainonlymatchingsthatdonotbelongtothestrong
core.
Indeed, assume now that V(  ) contains more than one matching19 that does not
belong to the strong core Cw(P). Take any matching μ1 ∈ V(  ),w h e r eμ1 / ∈ Cw(P).L e t
S(μ1) be the set of blocking∗ pairs of μ1.T h a ti s ,S(μ1) contains the pairs (S h) ∈ 2I ×H,
such that h  i μ1(i) for all i ∈ S,a n dt h e r ei sS  ⊆ μ1(h) such that [S  ∪S]  h μ1(h).C o n -
sider the deviation from μ1 to μ 
1 of the subset of blocking∗ pairs S (μ1) ⊆ S(μ1),w h e r e
S (μ1) contains the maximum number of blocking∗ pairs and is such that the subset
S(μ1)\S (μ1) does not contain any blocking∗ pair of μ 
1. We now establish formally that
μ 
1 exists. We do so by making use of the property of substitutable preferences, which
allows us to make use of the fact that a stable matching exists.
Claim 2. For any matching μ1 / ∈ Cw(P), there always exists a matching μ 
1 ∈ M,w h i c h
directly dominates μ1, that can be enforcedover μ1 by the blocking∗ pairs S (μ1) and such
that μ 
1 is not blocked∗ by any pair in S(μ1)\S (μ1).
Proof.D e ﬁ n eH  to be the set of hospitals that belong to some blocking∗ pair of μ:
H  ={ h ∈ H | either μ1(h) / ∈ Ch(μ1(h) P(h)) or ∃S ⊆ I such that (h S) ∈ S(μ1)}. Equally,
deﬁne I  to be the set of students who belong to some blocking∗ pair of μ: I  ={ i ∈ I |
either i   μ1(i) or ∃h ∈ H such that (h S) ∈ S(μ1) with i ∈ S}.
Consider the following restricted matching problem in which each agent ranks only
those agents with whom she can form a deviating blocking∗ pair. That is, the prefer-
ences of each h ∈ H  are only over the set I 
h ={ S ⊆ I  such that (h S) ∈ S(μ1)}.F o re a c h
i ∈ I , her preferences are restricted to the set H 
i ={ h ∈ H  ∪{ i} such that (h S) ∈ S(μ1)
with i ∈ S}.L e t P (μ1) denote these restricted preferences. Notice that the restricted
preferences P (μ1) also satisfy the substitutability property and, therefore, the matching
problem {H  I  P (μ1)} has at least one stable matching, call it μ .T h e nd e ﬁ n eμ 
1 and
19Of course, if V(  ) ={ μ} with μ/ ∈ Cw(P), then there exists a matching μ  and a pair (S h) ∈ 2I × H,
with S ⊆ μ (h),s u c ht h a th  i μ(i) for all i ∈ S, and there is S  ⊆ μ(h) such that [S  ∪S]  h μ(h).T h e nμ    μ 
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S (μ1) as follows. All agents who do not belong to either H  or I  do not belong to S (μ1)
(they do not move themselves, although they can lose their match in the move from μ1
to μ 
1 if they were initially matched to some of the deviating players in some blocking
pair of S (μ1)). Now consider the people in H  and I .E v e r yp a i r{h μ (h)} of μ  belongs
to S (μ1) and, hence, both h and μ (h) move from μ1 to μ 
1 to their match in μ ,w i t h
μ 
1(h) =[ S  ∪ μ (h)] and S  ⊆ μ1(h) such that [S  ∪ μ (h)]  h μ1(h). Every single student
(every hospital that has some places unﬁlled) at μ  who prefers to be unemployed (that
have some places unﬁlled) at μ  rather than to be in a hospital (hiring some students)
at μ1 belongs to S (μ1) and we let them become unemployed (leaving some places un-
ﬁlled) in the move from μ1 to μ 
1. Every single student (hospital) at μ  who prefers to be
employed (prefers hiring some students) at μ1 rather than to be unemployed (to have
some places unﬁlled) at μ  does not belong to S (μ1),b u tt oS(μ1) \ S (μ1).E v e r yp a i r
{h μ1(h)}ofμ1 withμ1(h) = μ (h) issuchthath(and/orμ1(h))belongstoS(μ1)\S (μ1)
when h (and/or μ1(h)) belongs to H  (belongs to I ). Clearly, the subset S(μ1) \ S (μ1)
does not contain any blocking∗ pair of μ 
1, because, otherwise, μ  would not be a stable
matching for the matching problem {H  I  P (μ1)}.  
Once we show the existence of μ 
1, the proof follows the proof of Theorem 2,b u tn o w
Lemma 1 is replaced by Lemma 4.  
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